第一节 问题与文献

逻辑经验主义对科学解释给予了极大的关注，但对于科学的文化理解则持有保留甚至是批判的态度，如此造成了在解释与理解及其之间关系问题上最富有彻底性的思想流派。但我们是否可以凭借逻辑经验主义在解释与理解之间的严格划界就判断逻辑经验主义“拒斥形而上学”？就凭此认为科学哲学没有历史？

从文献看，在科学哲学中，对科学（知识）的解释和理解源远流长，一些重要的哲学家多有所论。但不断被后世传承的经典文献并非不可胜数。

古希腊罗马哲学特别是自然哲学其实都是在解释并理解世界上的万事万物，试图回答“为什么”等本体论问题。据说毕达哥拉斯最早将哲学归结为“观察”和“理解”的学说。但从学理的角度看，真正对“解释”和“理解”做出哲学界定的应该首推亚里斯多德——Aristotle on interpretation。但经典的意义主要在于思想的延续，我们再一次看到另外一个哲学家在重温亚里斯多德有关“解释”的思想——对亚里斯多德解释理论的解释[1]。千年以后，思想家依然没有忘记亚里斯多德的解释思想，于是有了海德格尔对亚里斯多德解释的解释[2]。

到了近代，思想家们开始探讨认识理性本身的诸多问题。于是约翰·洛克写成了《人类理解论》[3]。这部经典的意义不仅仅在于它在当时就得到了众多哲人的关注[4]，这种经典的意义还在于，三百年以后的思想界依然在解读它[5]。

有关科学的解释和理解问题则是20世纪的事。了解这个问题的必读文献如《科学的解释与理解：略论科学的推理和理性》[6]；《科学的解释和理解的意义》[7]；《进行理解还是重建解释？》[8]；《科学理解的情境研究》[9]；《解释、理解和科学理论》[10]；《科学理解》[11]；《科学解释：从覆盖率到覆盖理论》[12]；《哲学视野中的科学理解》[13]；《科学理解：为何理由尚不充分？》[14]；《一种科学理解理论的纲要》[15]；《科学理解的推演模式》[16]；《理解的认识论价值》[17]。

在上述诸种文献中，卡尔-奥托·阿佩尔在《解释——理解争论的历史回顾》中从思想史的角度系统地梳理了这个问题的演化过程[18]；F.赖特的在《说明和理解》从概念演化的角度论述了有关问题的矛盾运动[19]；萨尔蒙（W.C.Salmon）的《科学解释40年》（Four Decades of Scientific Explanation ）[20]具有重要价值。

我国学者施雁飞出版了《科学解释学》（湖南出版社，1991）、潘德荣发表了《理解、解释与实践》（《中国社会科学》1994年第1期）、曹志平2005年出版了《理解与科学解释》（社会科学文献出版社，2005），郭贵春出版社了《隐喻、修辞与科学解释》（科学出版社，2007）。陈嘉明先生在《厦门大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2005年第6期发表了一篇论文指出，“解释”与“理解”这两个概念，在西方哲学史上分别被用来代表自然科学与人文社会科学的不同方法论，并经历了长期的争论。新老实证主义者皆主张一元的方法论，认为人文社会科学的方法也应以自然科学的精确方法为楷模，它们的目的都在于把握规律。新康德主义、后期维特根斯坦哲学主张“理解”的方法论，强调从“意义”“价值”的角度来把握人文社会科学的对象。哲学解释学提出了“解释学经验”的概念，将它作为理解的对象，意在把握科学活动与人类行为的本体论前提。笔者则提出“语境论”的解释观，将科学解释与人文理解的不同，归结为问题语境的差别。

[1] On Aristotle’s On interpretation ,Ammonius；translated by David Blank.With On Aristotle’s On interpretation,Boethius：first and second commentaries；translated by Norman Kretzmann；with essays by Richard Sorabji，Norman Kretzmann & Mario Mignucci.By：Ammonius，Hermiae.Ithaca，N.Y.：Cornell University Press，1998.

[2] Martin Heidegger：Phenomenological Interpretation of Aristotle .Top，.2010，Vol.23，Issue 2:136-156.

[3] An Essay Concerning Human Understanding，1690.In his Essay ，Locke explains the gradual unfolding of this conscious mind.Arguing against both the Augustinian view of man as originally sinful and the Cartesian position，which holds that man innately knows basic logical propositions，Locke posits an “empty” mind，a tabula rasa ，which is shaped by experience;sensations and reflections being the two sources of all our ideas.John Locke’s formulation of tabula rasa in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding .

[4] Richard H.Popkin:Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion，The Posthumous Essays，Of the Immortality of the Soul，and Of Suicide，From An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding of Miracles,David Hume edited，with an introduction，Indianapolis：Hackett Pub，c1998.

[5] The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s “Essay Concerning Human Understanding”,edited by Lex Newman,Cambridge;New York：Cambridge University Press，2007.

[6] Nicholas Rescher：Scientific Explanation and Understanding：Essays on Reasoning and Rationality in Science，Lanham，MD：University Press of America，c1983.

[7] J.D.Trout：“Scientific Explanation and the Sense of Understanding”，Philosophy of Science，Jun.，2002，Vol.69，Issue 2：212-233.

[8] K.Khalifa：“Inaugurating Understanding or Repackaging Explanation？”Philosophy of Science，JAN，2012，791：15-37.该文大意如下：Recently，several authors have argued that scientific understanding should be a new topic of philosophical research.In this article，I argue that the three most developed accounts of understanding-Grimm’s，de Regt’s，and de Regt and Dieks’s-can be replaced by earlier ideas about scientific explanation without loss.Indeed，in some cases，such replacements have clear benefits.

[9] Henk W.De Regt,Dennis Dieks：A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding，Synthese，Mar.，2005，Vol.144，Issue 1：137-170.该文大意如下：Achieving understanding of nature is one of the aims of science.In this paper we offer an analysis of the nature of scientific understanding that accords with actual scientific practice and accommodates the historical diversity of conceptions of understanding.Its core idea is a general criterion for the intelligibility of scientific theories that is essentially contextual：which theories conform to this criterion depends on contextual factors，and can change in the course of time.Our analysis provides a general account of how understanding is provided by scientific explanations of diverse types.In this way，it reconciles conflicting views of explanatory understanding，such as the causal-mechanical and the unificationist conceptions.

[10] Erik Weber：Explaining，Understanding and Scientific Theories ，Erkenntnis，Jan.，1996，Vol.44,Issue 1:1-23，23p.该文大意如下：One of the functions of scientific knowledge is to provide the theories and laws we need in order to understand the world.My article deals with the epistemic aspect of understanding，i.e.，with understanding as unification.The aim is to explicate what we have to do in order to make our scientific knowledge contribute to an increase of the degree to which the particular events we have observed，fit into our world-picture.The analysis contains two parts.First I define the concept of scientific epistemic explanation.Explanations of these type are the appropriate instruments for increasing the degree of unification of the particular events we have observed.In the second，largest part of the article I analyze the construction process of scientific epistemic explanations，focusing on the application of scientific theories.

[11] E Brian Davies：Scientific Understanding，2006，http：//philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2952/1/Understanding BJPS.doc;http：//philsci-archive.pitt.edu/2952/.该条目大意如下：Many of those actively involved in the physical sciences adopt a reductionist point of view，in which all aspects of the world are ultimately controlled by physical laws that are expressed in terms of mathematical equations.In this article we adopt a pluralistic approach to human understanding in which mathematically expressed laws of nature are merely one way among several of describing a world that is too vast and complex for our minds to be able to grasp in its entirety.

[12] Fritz Rohrlich：Scientific Explanation：From Covering Law to Covering Theory ，PSA：Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association，1994，Vol.1994，Volume One：Contributed Papers：69-77.该文大意如下：A new model of scientific explanation is proposed：the covering theory model.Its goal is understanding.One chooses the appropriate scientific theory and a model within it.From these follows the functioning of the explanandum，i.e.the way in which the model portrays it on one particular cognitive level.It requires an ontology and knowledge of the causal processes，probabilities，or potentialities （propensities）according to which it functions.This knowledge yields understanding.Explanations across cognitive levels demand pluralistic ontologies.An explanation is believed or only accepted depending on the credibility of the theory and the idealizations in the model.

[13] Henk W.de Regt，Sabina Leonelli，Kai Eigner：Scientific understanding：philosophical perspectives，Pittsburgh，Pa：University of Pittsburgh Press，c2009.该著由如下论文组成：1.Focusing on Scientific Understanding /Henk W.De Regt，Sabina Leonelli and Kai Eigner—Pt.I.Understanding，Explanation，and Intelligibility—2.Understanding and Scientific Explanation /Henk W.De Regt—3.Understanding without Explanation /Peter Lipton—4.Ontological Principles and the Intelligibility of Epistemic Activities /Hasok Chang—5.Reliability and the Sense of Understanding /Stephen R.Grimm—6.The Illusion of Depth of Understanding in Science /Petri Ylikoski—Pt.II.Understanding and Models—7.Understanding in Physics and Biology：From the Abstract to the Concrete /Margaret Morrison—8.Understanding by Modeling：An Objectual Approach /Tarja Knuuttila and Martina Merz—9.The Great Deluge：Simulation Modeling and Scientific Understanding /Johannes Lenhard—Pt.Ⅲ.Understanding in Scientific Practices—10.Understanding in Biology：The Impure Nature of Biological Knowledge /Sabina Leonelli—11.Understanding in Economics：Gray-Box Models /Marcel Boumans—12.Understanding in Physics：Bottom-Up versus Top-Down /Dennis Dieks—13.Understanding in the Engineering Sciences：Interpretive Structures /Mieke Boon—14.Understanding in Psychology：Is Understanding a Surplus？/Kai Eigner—15.Understanding in Political Science：The Plurality of Epistemic Interests /Jeroen Van Bouwel—16.Understanding in Historical Science：Intelligibility and Judgment /Edwin Koster.

[14] Ruth Berger：Understanding Science：Why Causes Are Not Enough，1998，Vol.65,Issue 2：306-332 该文大意如下：This paper is an empirical critique of causal accounts of scientific explanation.Drawing on explanations which rely on nonlinear dynamical modeling，I argue that the requirement of causal relevance is both too strong and too weak to be constitutive of scientific explanation.In addition，causal accounts obscure how the process of mathematical modeling produces explanatory information.I advance three arguments for the inadequacy of causal accounts.First，I argue that explanatorily relevant information is not always information about causes，even in cases where the explanandum has an identifiable causal history.Second，I argue that treating theoretical explanations as reductions from general causal laws does not accurately describe the types of “top-down” explanations typical of dynamical modeling.Finally，I argue that causal/mechanical accounts of explanation are intrinsically vulnerable to the irrelevance problem.

[15] Gerhard Schurz，Karel Lambert：Outline of a Theory of Scientific Understanding，Synthese，Oct.，1994，Vol.101,Issue 1：65-120.该文包括如下内容：The basic theory of scientific understanding presented in Sections 1-2 exploits three main ideas.First，that to understand a phenomenon P（for a given agent）is to be able to fit P into the cognitive background corpus C （of the agent）.Second，that to fit P into C is to connect P with parts of C （via “arguments” in a very broad sense）such that the unification of C increases.Third，that the cognitive changes involved in unification can be treated as sequences of shifts of phenomena in C.How the theory fits typical examples of understanding and how it excludes spurious unifications is explained in detail.Section 3 gives a formal description of the structure of cognitive corpuses which contain descriptive as well as inferential components.The theory of unification is then refined in the light of so called “puzzling phenomena”，to enable important distinctions，such as that between consonant and dissonant understanding.In Section 4，the refined theory is applied to several examples，among them a case study of the development of the atomic model.The final part contains a classification of kinds of understanding and a discussion of the relation between understanding and explanation.

[16] Mark Newman：“An Inferential Model of Scientific Understanding”，International Studies in the Philosophy of Science ，Mar 2012，Vol.26，Issue 1：1-26.该文主要内容如下：In this article I argue that two current accounts of scientific understanding are incorrect and I propose an alternative theory.My new account draws on recent research in cognitive psychology which reveals the importance of making causal and logical inferences on the basis of incoming information.To understand a phenomenon we need to make particular kinds of inferences concerning the explanations we are given.Specifically，we come to understand a phenomenon scientifically by developing mental models that incorporate the correct causal and logical properties responsible for the causes or logical properties of the phenomenon being explained.

[17] Henk W.De Regt：“The Epistemic Value of Understanding”，Philosophy of Science，Dec2009，Vol.76，Issue 5：585-597.该文大意如下：This article analyzes the epistemic value of understanding and offers an account of the role of understanding in science.First，I discuss the objectivist view of the relation between explanation and understanding，defended by Carl Hempel and J.D.Trout.I challenge this view by arguing that pragmatic aspects of explanation are crucial for achieving the epistemic aims of science.Subsequently，I present an analysis of these pragmatic aspects in terms of “intelligibility” and a contextual account of scientific understanding based on this notion.

[18] 〔德〕卡尔-奥托·阿佩尔：《解释——理解争论的历史回顾》，《哲学译丛》1987年第6期。

[19] 〔苏兰〕F.赖特：《说明和理解》，《哲学译丛》1988年第5期。

[20] W.C.Salmon：Four Decades of Scientific Explanation ，Minnesota，The University of Minnesota Press，1989：8.