第一节 问题与文献

发现与辩护问题也是逻辑经验主义的基本范畴之一，逻辑经验主义对发现与辩护区分也是它最富有思想特色的判据。但问题是，我们是否可以从发现与辩护的划界就可以断言逻辑经验主义没有历史？在逻辑经验主义之前，在人类漫长的思想过程中，是否存在发现与辩护问题的区分？是否还有其他的思想者通过发现与辩护问题的讨论并对维也纳学派发生了影响？

从文献看，发现（或发现语境）与辩护（或辩护语境）是科学哲学热议的一对重要范畴，O.莱曼在他编辑的《科学哲学基本观念从A到Z》[1][2]中，是这样定义这对范畴的：“发现语境和辩护语境的划分是由赖欣巴哈提出的，用以标识科学理论的发现过程和科学理论发现后的评价过程。发现语境属于心理学而辩护语境才属于科学哲学。”（Context of discovery vs context of justification：Distinction introduced by Reichenbach to mark the difference between the processes by which scientific theories are invented and the logical and methodological procedures by which they are appraised after they have been formulated.The context of discovery was supposed to belong to psychology while the context of justification was supposed to be the proper domain of philosophy of science.Developing philosophical theories of science amounted to devising a rational pattern for science，a pattern in which scientific methodology for theory-testing，explanation and theory-acceptance have a fixed and precise logical form.）

J.史科尔和F.斯坦勒在他们的《重温发现和辩护：关于语境区分的历史和哲学审视》[3]堪称这个领域的经典著述。该著分三部分：第一部分主要介绍区分发现语境和辩护语境的语境；第二部分主要介绍对这对范畴进行研究的先驱；第三部分主要介绍研究这对范畴的当代改进及应用。

研究这对范畴的重要文献还有：S.巴格斯的《赖欣巴哈的相对优先性假定及其对发现语境与辩护语境的区分》[4]；J.麦克林的《超越发现与辩护区分》[5]；R.费雷塔斯的《究竟谁能摆脱发现语境与辩护语境的区分？》[6]；A.兰森兹的《发现语境和辩护语境究竟留下了什么？》[7]以及C.考迪格的《发现与辩护》[8]，等等。

下面这些文献从不同角度或侧面论及发现语境和辩护语境这对范畴，如《发现和规则手册》[9]；《塞曼效应的发现》[10]；《反思电子的发现》[11]；《科学史家可能是科学实在论者吗？》[12]；《电子的表述》[13]；《科学发现的社会基础》[14]；《为什么哲学家不必为理解科学发现而失望》[15]；《科学发现的形式和功能》[16]；《燃素理论的破灭》[17]；《发现的逻辑：对三种路径的分析》[18]；《科学作为发现》[19]；《表述与参与》[20]；《发现语境和辩护语境》[21]；《自然主义的回归》[22]；《解释科学发现》[23]；《发现和辩护》[24]；《必要的张力》[25]；《科学发现：创造过程的计算路径》[26]；《为什么发现的逻辑被抛弃？》[27]；《经验和预测》[28]；《科学发现作为历史的做作》[29]，等等。

国内的研究主要有：金吾伦先生翻译的Carl R.Kordig所撰写的《发现和辩护》，《世界科学》1983年第9期；王娜：《“发现”与“辩护”为何难以二分——从科学实践的观点看》，《哲学动态》2010年第5期；石诚：《发现语境与辩护语境区分的再分析》，《科学技术哲学研究》2010年第4期。

金先生在译文中指出，发现和辩护间的区别是含混不清的。这使得整个发现逻辑的争论变得难以理解。因为争论以这种区别为先决条件，真正的发现已很好地确立，很好确立的东西被辩护。恰当的区别有三：最初的思索、似然性和可接受性。最初时最初的思索来说不是基本的。我们并不需要很好地支持最初想到一个假设的理由。最初的思索既不需要是似然的，也不需要是可接受的。正如汉森所指出的，逻辑对于似然性和可接受性两者是基本的。一个假设需要很好地支持其或似然或可接受的理由。这些理由不需要与其时经受检验的特殊科学理论相关。有关似然性和可接受性的理由之间并没有基本的不同。不同是程度的不同。可接受性比之似然性要求更多。

[1] Oliver Leaman：“Context of Discovery vs Context of Justification”，Philosophy of Science A-Z ,Edinburgh：Edinburgh University Press，2007.

[2] Oliver Leaman（General Editor），Philosophy A-Z Series，An alphabetically arranged guide to the philosophy of science.Philosophy of Science A-Z gives concise，accurate and illuminating accounts of key positions，concepts，arguments and figures in the philosophy of science.It aids understanding of current debate plains their historical development and connects them with broader philosophical issues.It presupposes little prior knowledge of philosophy of science and is equally useful to the beginner，the more advanced student and the general reader.Readers will find in it illuminating explanations，careful analysis，relevant examples，open problems and，last but not least，precise arguments.Philosophy of science is a flourishing discipline and Philosophy of Science A to Zis a practical and imaginative way into and through it.

[3] Jutta Schickore，Friedrich Steinle：Revisiting Discoveryand Justification：Historical and Philosophical Perspectives on the Context Distinction ，Dordrecht：Springer 2006.The distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification has had a turbulent career in philosophy of science.This book presents a debate about the nature，development，and significance of the context distinction，about its merits and flaws.It provides readings and analyses of the original textual sources for the context distinction.该著是一部论文集，主要包括如下章节：Jutta Schickore & Friedrich Steinle, Introduction: Revisiting the Context Distinction.Part Ⅰ The Contexts of the Distinction:Don Howard, Lost Wanderers in the Forest of Knowledge:Some Thoughts on the Discovery-Justification Distinction; Gregor Schiemann, Inductive Justification and Discovery. On Hans Reichenbach’s Foundation of the Autonomy of the Philosophy of Science; Alan Richardson, Freedom in a Scientific Society:Reading the Context of Reichenbach’s Contexts.Part Ⅱ Forerunners？ Jutta Schickore, A Forerunner？ Perhaps, but not to the Context Distinction. William Whewell’s Germano-Cantabrigian History of the Fundamental Ideas; Lothar Schfer, Autonomy versus Development:Duhem on Progress in Science; Volker Peckhaus, Psychologism and the Distinction between Discovery and Justification.Part Ⅲ Revisions and Applications:Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Context of Discovery versus Context of Justification and Thomas Kuhn Thomas Sturm & Gerd Gigerenzer, How Can We Use the Distinction between Discovery and Justification？ On Weaknesses of the Strong Programme in Sociology of Science;Thomas Nickles, Heuristic Appraisal:Context of Discovery or Justification？ Friedrich Steinle, Experiment, Concept Formation and the Limits of Justification:“Discovering” the Two Electricities; Thomas Potthast, Contexts of Justifying and Discovering the Nature of Ecosystems:From Concepts to Objects and vice-versa;Theodore Arabatzis, On the Inextricability of the Context of Discovery and the Context of Justification.

[4] Samet Bagce:Reichenbach on the Relative a Priori and the Context of Discovery/Justification Distinction,Synthese，Jun 2011，Vol.181 Issue 1:79-93.

[5] James MacLean：“Transcending the Discovery-Justification Dichotomy”，International Journal for the Semiotics of Law ，Mar 2012，Vol.25 Issue 1:123-141.This essay examines judicial decision-making from the perspective of Whiteheadian “process philosophy”.As such，it seeks to demonstrate how the explanatory categories of process thought can be applied to law and legal reasoning in such a way as to expose the nature of the processes that constitute their development.The essay begins with a description of the judicial task drawn from contemporary theorising about legal argumentation，identified in terms of the separation of contexts of decision-making：discovery and justification.In light of this discussion，the essay then adopts Whiteheadian terminology to provide the basis for an alternative understanding and description of the way that a discrete instance of judicial decision-making develops and is maintained within the decision-making process.In this way，independent of any debate over the separation of contexts，the essay seeks not only to expose and unpack the otherwise hidden micro-processes that contribute to and constitute a legal decision but also，by utilising the same conceptual categories of Whiteheadian process thought，to provide a coherent and consistent account of the macro-processes more commonly observed on the level of law as a social realty.The essay argues that the explanatory power of the categoreal scheme of process thought provides a better tool for understanding these relations on all levels.［ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR］

[6] Renan de Freitas:Whoever Could Get Rid of the Context of Discovery/Context of Justification Dichotomy？A Proposal Based on Recent Developments in Clinical Research.Springer;Pietrobon，Ricardo.Journal of Medicine & Philosophy.Jan/Feb2007，Vol.32 Issue 1:25-42.

[7] A.R.P.Ransanz:What Remains of the Discovery-Justification Distinction ？THEORIA-REVISTA DE TEORIA HISTORIA Y FUNDAMENTOS DE LA CIENCIA;SEP，2007;22;3:347-350.This brief commentary focuses on the first chapter of Abductive Reasoning （2006），where Aliseda offers new conceptual tools for examining the methodological models in which a distinction between contexts of scientific research is traced.In particular，we analyze Popper’s position with respect to the problem of discovery and distinguish two different senses in which he deliberately uses the term ‘discovery’ in LSD （1959）;this，in turn，lends support to Aliseda’s heterodox interpretation of the Popperian methodology.Last，we examine the comparison the author makes between Popper and Simon as it contains the primary reasons for asserting that the discovery-justification dichotomy is doomed to failure.

[8] Carl R Kordig:“Discovery and Justification”，Philosophy of Science ;Mar 1978，Vol.45 Issue 1:110-117. The distinction between discovery and justification is ambiguous.This obscures the debate over a logic of discovery.For the debate presupposes the distinction.Real discoveries are well established.What is well established is justified.The proper distinctions are three：initial thinking，plausibility，and acceptability.Logic is not essential to initial thinking.We do not need good supporting reasons to initially think of an hypothesis.Initial thoughts need be neither plausible nor acceptable.Logic is essential，as Hanson noted，to both plausibility and acceptability.An hypothesis needs good supporting reasons to be either plausible or acceptable.Such reasons need not be relative to the particular scientific theory undergoing test at the time.There is no fundamental difference between reasons relevant to plausibility and acceptability.The difference is one of degree.Acceptability requires more than plausibility.

[9] P.Achinstein:“Discovery and Rule-Books”，in T.Nickles ed.，Scientific Discovery，Logic，and Rationality （Dordrecht：Reidel），1980:117-132.

[10] T.Arabatzis：“The Discovery of the Zeeman Effect：A Case Study of the Interplay between Theory and Experiment”，Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 23，1992：365-388.

[11] T.Arabatzis：“Rethinking the ‘Discovery’ of the Electron”，Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 27，1996：405-4350.

[12] T.Arabatzis：“Can a Historian of Science be a Scientific Realist？”Philosophy of Science 68，Proceedings，2001：531-541.

[13] T.Arabatzis：Representing Electrons：A Biographical Approach to Theoretical Entities，Chicago：University of Chicago Press，2006.

[14] A.Brannigan：The Social Basis of Scientific Discoveries，New York：Cambridge University Press，1981.

[15] R.Burian：“Why Philosophers Should not Despair of Understanding Scientific Discovery”，in T.Nickles ed.，Scientific Discovery，Logic，and Rationality，Dordrecht：Reidel，1980：317-336.

[16] K.L.Caneva：“The Form and Function of Scientific Discoveries”，Dibner Library Lecture Series ，Washington，DC：Smithsonian Institution Libraries，2001.

[17] J.B.Conant：“The Overthrow of the Phlogiston Theory”，in J.B.Conant & L.K.Nash eds Case Histories in Experimental Science.Massachusetts：Harvard University Press，1957.

[18] M.V.Curd：“The Logic of Discovery：An Analysis of Three Approaches”，in T.Nickles ed.:Scientific Discovery，Logic，and Rationality Dordrecht：Reidel，1980：201-2190.

[19] G.Gutting：“Science as Discovery”，Revue Internationale de Philosophie 131-132，1980:26-48.

[20] I.Hacking：Representing and Intervening ，Cambridge：Cambridge University Press，1983.

[21] P.Hoyningen-Huene：“Context of Discovery and Context of Justification”,Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 18，1987：501-515.

[22] P.Kitcher：“The Naturalists Return”, The Philosophical Review 101，1992：53-114.

[23] N.Koertge：“Explaining Scientific Discovery”,in P.D.Asquith and T.Nickles eds，PSA：Proceedings of the 1982 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association ，East Lansing：Philosophy of Science Association，Vol.1，1982：14-28.

[24] C.R.Kordig：“Discovery and Justification”，Philosophy of Science 45，1978：110-117.

[25] T.S.Kuhn：The Essential Tension ，Chicago and London：The University of Chicago Press，1977.

[26] P.H.A.Simon Langley，G.L.Bradshaw，J.M.Zytkow：Scientific Discovery：Computational Explorations of the Creative Process，Cambridge ，MA：MIT Press，1987.

[27] L.Laudan：“Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned？” in T.Nickles ed.:Scientific Discovery，Logic，and Rationality ，Dordrecht：Reidel，1980：173-183.

[28] H.Reichenbach：Experience and Prediction ，Chicago：The University of Chicago Press，1938.

[29] J.Stachel：“Scientific Discoveries as Historical Artifacts”，in K.Gavroglu et al.eds.：Trends in the Historiography of Science ，Dordrecht：Kluwer，1994：139-148.