第一节 问题与文献

理论与观察是逻辑经验主义科学哲学着力探索的一对范畴，也是第一次对这对范畴进行严肃的学术梳理的哲学流派。但是能否仅仅据此认为逻辑经验主义就享有对理论与观察之间关系问题的思想垄断？对这个问题的解答也关系到逻辑经验主义有无历史，科学哲学有无历史的判断。

从文献看，早在古希腊时期就有思想家提到理论与观察这个问题。据史记载，有一次毕达哥拉斯和名为Leon的王子应邀出席参观一场盛大的竞技比赛，该王子就问毕达哥拉斯：“能否谈谈你是怎样的一个人？”毕达哥拉斯回答说：“我是哲学家（philosopher）”，王子之前从未听过这个字眼，就向大师请教，毕达哥拉斯说：“就好像今天来参加盛会的人，有一些是沽名钓誉者，有些是为奖赏而拼死拼活的，而我呢？我来这里就只是为了‘观察’和‘理解’这里的一切，而‘观察’和‘理解’就是哲学。”[1]

一些重要的科学哲学教科书或综述性著述都论及理论与观察之间的关系，如“科学哲学百科全书”[2]；“科学哲学的历史典藏”[3]。

专门论述理论与观察之间关系的著述主要有：奈格尔的“科学中的观察与理论”[4]；“理论与观察的划界”[5]；“理论、观察和科学实在论”[6][7]；“从观察到理论”[8]；“理论与观察的两种类型”[9]；“渗透理论的观察、对理论中立的观察、不受理论制约的观察”[10]；“渗透理论的观察能检验理论吗？”[11]；“论观察的理论渗透性”[12]；“在理论与观察之间：T.梅亚尔对月球运动的探索”[13]，等等。

此外，维基百科以及斯坦福大学和印第安纳大学的有关网站有关理性主义与经验主义的内容也值得关注[14]，如Rationalism vs.Empiricism entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy、Rationalism vs.Empiricism at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project，等等。从这些网站内容看，在理论与观察之间关系问题上，理性主义与经验论不可分割地关联着，但在知识本质、知识的来源、知识的判据等问题上有较大的差距。[15]

我国学者特别是科学哲学研究者也十分注重理论与观察问题的研究，专文有：张谨的《观察与理论关系的历史考察及其哲学思考》，《华中科技大学学报》2001年第2期；赵妙法的《西方科学哲学中观察与理论关系评析》，《安徽大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》1998年第4期。

[1] There is little direct evidence as to the kind and amount of knowledge which Pythagoras acquired，or as to his definite philosophical views.Everything of the kind mentioned by Plato and Aristotle is attributed not to Pythagoras，but to the Pythagoreans.Heraclitus stated that he was a man of extensive learning;and Xenophanes claimed that he believed in the transmigration of souls（Diogenes Lartius，viii.36，comp.Aristotle，de Anima ，i.3;Herodotus，ii.123.）Xenophanes mentions the story of his interceding on behalf of a dog that was being beaten，professing to recognise in its cries the voice of a departed friend.Pythagoras is supposed to have claimed that he had been Euphorbus，the son of Panthus，in the Trojan war，as well as various other characters，a tradesman，a courtesan，etc.（Porphyry，Vit.Pyth.26;Pausanias，ii.17;Diogenes Lartius，viii.5;Horace，Od.i.28，1.10）In his book The Life of Apollonius of Tyana ，Philostratus wrote that Pythagoras knew not only who he was himself，but also who he had been.（Flavius Philostratus：The Life of Apollonius of Tyana ，trad.F.C.Conybeare，Vol.2，London，1912，Book VI：39.）

[2] The Philosophy of Science：An Encyclopedia，London：Routledge Taylor & Francis Group，2006.

[3] The Philosophy of Science：An Historical Anthology ，Chichester，U.K.;Malden，MA ：Blackwell，2009.

[4] Ernest Nagel：Observation and Theory in Science，The Three Lectures，Presented as the First Series of the Alvin and Fanny Blaustein Thalheimer Lectures，Concern the Logical Status of Scientific Theories in Relation to Observation ，1971：134.

[5] André Kukla：“The Theory-Observation Distinction”，The Philosophical Review ，04/1996，Volume 105，Issue 2:173-230.

[6] Jody Azzouni：“Theory，Observation and Scientific Realism”，The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science ，09/2004，Volume 55，Issue 3:371-392.

[7] A normative constraint on theories about objects which we take to be real is explored：such theories are required to track the properties of the objects which they are theories of.Epistemic views in which observation （and generalizations of it）play a central role，and holist views which see epistemic virtues as applicable only to whole theories，are contrasted in the light of this constraint.It’s argued that global-style epistemic virtues can’t meet the constraint，although （certain）epistemic views within which observation （and，more generally，thick epistemic access）are centralized do meet it.

[8] Holly Tuokko：“From Observation to Theory”，Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society，ISSN 1355-6177，05/2002，Volume 8，Issue 4：602-603.

[9] Marshall Spector：“Theory and Observation I-II”，The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science ，08/1966，Volume 17，Issue1-2：89-104.

[10] William A Rottschaefer：“Observation：Theory-Laden，Theory-Neutral or Theory-Free？”Southern Journal of Philosophy ，ISSN 0038-4283，1976，Volume 14，Issue 4：499-509.

[11] Harold I Brown：“A Theory-Laden Observation Can Test the Theory”，The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science ，ISSN 0007-0882，09/1993，Volume 44，Issue 3：555-559.

[12] John Weckert：“The Theory-Ladenness of Observations”，Studies in History and Philosophy of Science ，ISSN 0039-3681，1986，Volume 17，Issue 1：115-127.

[13] Steven A.Wepster：Between theory and observations：Tobias Mayer’s Explorations of Lunar Motion ，1751-1755，New York；London ：Springer，c2010.

[14] 根据http：//plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/提供的资讯，有关理性主义与经验论的冲突与融合的思想过程大致如下：In epistemology and in its modern sense, rationalism is “any view appealing to reason as a source of knowledge or justification”. In more technical terms, it is a method or a theory “in which the criterion of the truth is not sensory but intellectual and deductive” Different degrees of emphasis on this method or theory lead to a range of rationalist standpoints, from the moderate position “that reason has precedence over other ways of acquiring knowledge” to the more extreme position that reason is “the unique path to knowledge”. Given a pre-modern understanding of reason, rationalism is identical to philosophy, the Socratic life of inquiry, or the zetetic （skeptical） clear interpretation of authority （open to the underlying or essential cause of things as they appear to our sense of certainty）. In recent decades, Leo Strauss sought to revive “Classical Political Rationalism” as a discipline that understands the task of reasoning, not as foundational, but as maieutic. Rationalism should not be confused with rationality, nor with rationalization.（http://en.wikipedia.org /wiki/Rationalism.）

[15] The dispute between rationalism and empiricism concerns the extent to which we are dependent upon sense experience in our effort to gain knowledge.Rationalists claim that there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sense experience.Empiricists claim that sense experience is the ultimate source of all our concepts and knowledge. Rationalists generally develop their view in two ways. First, they argue that there are cases where the content of our concepts or knowledge outstrips the information that sense experience can provide. Second, they construct accounts of how reason in some form or other provides that additional information about the world. Empiricists present complementary lines of thought. First, they develop accounts of how experience provides the information that rationalists cite, insofar as we have it in the first place. （Empiricists will at times opt for skepticism as an alternative to rationalism:if experience cannot provide the concepts or knowledge the rationalists cite, then we don’t have them.） Second, empiricists attack the rationalists’ accounts of how reason is a source of concepts or knowledge. The dispute between rationalism and empiricism takes place within epistemology, the branch of philosophy devoted to studying the nature, sources and limits of knowledge. The defining questions of epistemology include the following. What is the nature of propositional knowledge, knowledge that a particular proposition about the world is true？ Knowing a particular proposition requires both that we believe it and that it be true, but it also clearly requires something more, something that distinguishes knowledge from a lucky guess. Let’s call this additional element‘warrant’. A good deal of philosophical work has been invested in trying to determine the nature of this additional element. How can we gain knowledge？ We can form true beliefs just by making some lucky guesses. How we can gain warranted beliefs is unclear. Moreover, to know the world, we must think about it, and it is not clear how we gain the concepts we use in thought or what assurance, if any, we have that the ways in which we divide up the world using our concepts correspond to divisions that actually exist. What are the limits of our knowledge？ Some aspects of the world may be within the limits of our thought but beyond the limits of our knowledge; faced with competing descriptions of them, we cannot know which description is true. Some aspects of the world may even be beyond the limits of our thought, so that we cannot form intelligible descriptions of them, let alone know that a particular description is true. The disagreement between rationalists and empiricists primarily concerns the second question, regarding the sources of our concepts and knowledge. In some instances, their disagreement on this topic leads them to give conflicting responses to the other questions as well. They may disagree over the nature of warrant or about the limits of our thought and knowledge. Our focus here will be on the competing rationalist and empiricist responses to the second question.（http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/Rationalism vs. Empiricism，First published Thu Aug.19, 2004; Substantive Revision Wed Aug.6, 2008.）