Preface

From its beginnings in Ancient Greece，the Western intellectual tradition has had a decidedly individualistic orientation.This is true both in philosophy，especially in the analytic tradition of the Anglophone world，as well as in psychology since its birth as an academic discipline in the 19th century.

But things are beginning to change.In philosophy，an important new paradigm has emerged in the last few decades that attempts to characterize human shared （or collective） intentionality.Influential philosophers such as John Searle，Michael Bratman，and Margaret Gilbert have uncovered some of the many ways in which human activities that，on the surface，seem individualistic are in reality only possible because of the underlying social relationships and cultural conventions，norms，and institutions that support and structure them.The “deep structure” of uniquely human psychology is essentially social and cultural.

In psychology，the change is being instigated by evolutionary approaches.When looking at the evolution of the human species in comparison with that of its nearest primate relatives，it is clear that the most important differences derive from humans’unique forms of social interaction.In particular，humans seem to be much more inclined to engage in various kinds of cooperation，including unique forms of cooperative communication.This enables human groups to create all kinds of things collectively that no individual could create on its own.This applies most obviously to things such as computers and skyscrapers，but it also applies to more basic human competencies such as conventional linguistic communication and individual self-regulation via the society’s moral norms.

Why We Cooperate is based on my Tanner Lectures delivered at Stanford University in 2008.The argument here-formulated for a more general audience-is that in comparison with other primate species humans are inordinately cooperative.Young children seem to be cooperative from the beginning，and indeed adult socialization and training does not seem to have much effect.This is not to say that adult socialization is not important-it is-but only for older children；it does not create young children’s generally cooperative nature that shows up both when they go to some trouble to help others fulfill their goals，and also when they collaborate with one another to achieve common goals.Much of the research reviewed in this book illustrates the unique waysin which humans are adapted for cooperation.

A Natural History of Human Thinking is aimed more at an academic audience.Its central claim is that uniquely human forms of thinking are built on a primate base-great apes do indeed think in order to solve problems-but then it goes well beyond this.What enables human thinking to go beyond general primate thinking is its incorporation of social processes.It is social and communicative engagement with others that enables humans to，for example，form perspectival cognitive representations （so that the same animal may be called either a dog or a pet） and to think about thinking recursively.And the norms that govern human reasoning processes，for example，not to contradict oneself directly，are norms that come from the society as a whole and，in essence，define what it is to be rational in the culture.The metaphor used to open the book is that human thinking is like a jazz musician improvising a new tune in private.It is individual activity，of course，but it is made possible by a cultural history of jazz music that has created the instruments，the basic patterns，and the audience that constitute this particular way of making music.

I am no expert，but from what I read in cross-cultural psychology，China along with many other East Asian countries are much more“collectivist”cultures than those in which I have grown up and studied.It is thus possible that many of the things I argue for in these texts are obvious to Chinese readers.But obvious or not，I only argue for their accuracy，and I hope they do provide some measure of insight into the basic processes of human social interaction and thinking，even for readers who are already steeped in collectivist ways of thinking and acting.

Michael Tomasello

2016.7.7